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S

ince the North Atlantic Treaty Organization first formally raised the issue of
expanding its membership in 1994, most of Central and Eastern Europe’s
new democracies have lobbied extensively for invitations into Europe’s preeminent security alliance. In 1997 at the Madrid Summit, only three states—the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—were offered invitations to join. They
became full members in 1999. In 2000, nine states known as the “Vilnius Nine”
came together in Vilnius, Lithuania, to promote their joint membership appeal.
These states included Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Since that time the momentum for expansion
has grown as Croatia has joined in the call for membership in NATO.
Although US President George W. Bush’s Administration was quiet on
the question of NATO’s expansion in its first months in office, upon his first presidential trip to Europe in June 2001, Bush called for NATO’s enlargement “from
the Baltic to Black Sea.”1 Such robust appeals for expansion increased after the
11 September 2001 terrorist strikes on the United States.
Among all applicant states, Slovenia has been viewed by both politicians and analysts as the most likely candidate to be invited at NATO’s forthcoming summit in Prague in November 2002. On 21 June 2000, US Senator
Joe Biden remarked that Slovenia was “eminently qualified for NATO membership” and a “shoo-in in Prague.”2 On 31 May 2002, Senator George Voinovich
similarly stated, “I do not know of any of the aspirants that are interested in
NATO that [is] more qualified than Slovenia.”3 Thomas S. Szayna also argued in
a recent study that Slovenia was the best prepared of all applicants for membership.4 Such beliefs were echoed at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, in
the summer of 2001.5
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While Slovenia is known to many defense specialists and military
experts, most Americans know little about this small European state, which has a
land mass similar in size to New Jersey and a population of only two million
people. This article attempts to bridge that gap by providing a political and military assessment of Slovenia’s potential contributions to the alliance as a formal
member-state. Such questions will become increasingly important to the parliaments of the NATO allies, and especially to the US Senate, once the eventual
invitees undergo NATO’s domestic ratification processes. Excellent research has
already been conducted on the applicant states, but no widely available analysis
on Slovenia includes the political changes that came with the 9/11 terrorist
strikes, or the military adaptations that have continued in this aspiring NATO
state in 2001 and 2002.6
In this article, the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will be used to assess Slovenia’s ability to meet the alliance’s political and military goals. These
benchmarks for the applicants were refined in 1999 at the Washington Summit,
but in no way guarantee an applicant’s automatic acceptance into NATO if it
meets the ostensible criteria.7 These expectations, though, will undoubtedly be
used by NATO and its constituents’ legislatures to assess which states are ready
for membership. This article also includes analysis of Slovenia’s cooperation in
the war on terrorism, a security challenge for NATO that became increasingly
important after 9/11, and likely a crucial political variable to the US Senate in the
ratification process. These findings suggest that Slovenia’s membership in
NATO serves the alliance’s interest, especially due to its geographic location and
its implemented military reforms. Recent domestic political developments in
Slovenia, however, raise some concerns regarding public support for NATO and
the alliance’s broader mission in European security.
Slovenia voted for its independence from Yugoslavia on 13 December
1990. In a ten-day war that began on 25 June 1991, Slovenia fought and gained
that independence from Yugoslavia and its dictator, Slobodan Milosevic. The
United States recognized Slovenia as an independent state on 7 April 1992, and
Slovenia was seated at the United Nations in May 1992.
Through a vote in its National Assembly, Slovenia formally requested
membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace on 30 March 1994, and since that
time the country has actively campaigned for an invitation into the alliance.8 At the
Madrid Summit in 1997, Slovenia and Romania were favored for membership by
Canada, Germany, France, and Italy, but the United States was unwilling to expand
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the alliance beyond its three favored candidates. Although Slovenia and Romania
lost their battle to gain membership at that time, NATO promised to keep its doors
open to all worthy applicants.9 At the Washington Summit in 1999, while in the
midst of NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo, the allies announced that they
would again consider expansion at the Prague Summit in November 2002. With
the likelihood of Slovenia’s membership in NATO being so high, and given the ensuing questions that will likely come during the domestic ratification processes, it
is time to assess Slovenia’s potential contributions to the alliance.10

NATO’s Political Expectations
In the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, the alliance established two
sets of expectations for applicant states. The first set addressed NATO’s “political” goals for potential members. In short, NATO expected that the applicants
would be fully-functioning democracies, with civilian control of their military
forces. The applicants should have all border disputes resolved, as well as resolutions to any remaining problems regarding minority rights. The applicants, more
broadly, must also share the alliance’s values, meaning that the applicants must
accept the principle of consensus decisionmaking and believe in the alliance’s
overall strategic objectives.11
Since Slovenia gained its independence from Yugoslavia, its democratic
transition has been viewed favorably by independent analysts, nongovernmental
organizations, and governments alike.12 National elections for the presidency
(five-year terms) took place in 1992 and 1997, and are on schedule for 2002. Its
legislative branch, consisting of two houses, has also undergone peaceful democratic elections. Both houses, the National Assembly (90 seats) and the National
Council (40 seats), have multi-party representation. Human rights organizations,
including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Freedom House,
have found little to criticize regarding Slovenia’s protection of civil and political
rights.13 The US State Department’s 2001 Annual Report on Human Rights provides generally positive views of Slovenia’s transition to and practice of democracy, including its treatment of minority populations.14
Slovenia also scores well in its civilian control of the military. After its
short military battle for independence and initial democratic elections in 1992, it
began its military restructuring program. While under the Yugoslav People’s
Army (JNA), each of Yugoslavia’s six provinces contributed troops to the federal
military force, which was supplemented by Territorial Defense forces in each
province. The Territorial Defense forces were intended to serve as a backup to the
JNA in the event of an attack from an outside aggressor. After independence and a
new constitution, the Territorial Defense forces were placed under the formal
control of the Slovenian government, with the President as commander in chief.
In reality, however, the legislative branch and the Minister of Defense have the
largest voices in military matters. Slovenian military expert Anton J. Bebler
notes that after independence, the military “was placed under strict civilian con66
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“Slovenia has been viewed by both politicians and
analysts as the most likely candidate to be invited
at NATO’s forthcoming summit in Prague.”

trol,” and that the parliament is in full control of defense appropriations.15 He also
notes that a “civilianization” of the Defense Ministry took place, along with
greater transparency of all military issues to the public. According to Bebler, a
“participatory management style” now characterizes the Slovenian military.16
Slovenian military professionals are barred from belonging to a political party,
which also depoliticizes the military.
Perhaps the only notable problem in the area of civil-military relations
has been the temptation of personal aggrandizement of civilian leaders in the
Ministry of Defense, especially in the first years of Slovenia’s independence.
Such problems initially involved former Defense Minister Janez Jansa, who used
his office to appoint political supporters to military leadership posts, created his
own special operations forces, and used his office to criticize the President. Before his removal from office, Jansa used his position for his own political gain,
and on many occasions acted with minimal or no consultation with the President,
effectively placing himself above the President in the military chain of command. While personal competition seems inherent in bureaucratic arrangements,
Jansa’s ability to dominate defense affairs was of some concern to analysts.17 At
the same time, the most recent analysis done by NATO’s Membership Action
Plan on Slovenia in 2002 gives no attention to past problems in the Defense Ministry, tacitly acknowledging that such problems no longer remain.18 Jelena
Trifunovic notes that problems remain regarding the absence of women as military professionals.19 Under the current leadership of Defense Minister Anton
Grizold, however, Slovenia has an excellent record of civilian and military cooperation that meets the intent of the Study on NATO Enlargement.
Another element of the Study on NATO Enlargement addressed the importance of resolving any remaining border disputes. In this area Slovenia again
should be judged a success. It has resolved all remaining border claims with Italy,
Hungary, and Austria. The one border state of some concern has been Croatia. Political differences remain over the ownership of the Krsko nuclear plant, Croatia’s
claims over Ljubljanska Bank’s debts claimed by Croatian citizens, and, most important, differences over fishing and drilling rights in Piran Bay. These diplomatic
differences are real and remain problematic.20 At the same time, the chances that
such problems could become militarily threatening are remote. Petar Stipetic, CroWinter 2002-03
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atian Army Chief of General Staff, asserted in May 2002, “Slovene-Croatian military relations are the best in the region.”21 Although the Croatian border issues
represent a lingering source of diplomatic concern, all other border issues are resolved, ostensibly, to NATO’s expectations for new members.
It is in the last political measurement of Slovenia that more serious concerns surface: NATO applicants are required to share alliance values. Such an
ambiguous benchmark allows for different interpretations over NATO’s intent.
When examining the government’s support of NATO and membership in the alliance, no doubt exists regarding Slovenia’s interest and willingness to support the
alliance. Support also exists among Slovenia’s religious elite, the Slovene
Bishops, who have also voted in favor of NATO membership. The vast majority
of Slovenia’s people identify themselves as Catholic, and the Bishops have noted
that NATO shares democratic and moral values worth promoting in Europe.22
At the same time, however, since NATO’s 1997 rejection of Slovenia, a
noticeable decrease in public support for NATO membership has developed. In
1997, prior to the Madrid conference, the public’s approval for membership in
NATO was at its peak. The Defence Studies Research Centre of the Social
Studies Institute at the University of Ljubljana found that 60 percent of the public
approved of membership prior to Madrid. These approval numbers dropped to 56
percent in 1999 and to 48.3 percent in 2002. The number of those polled who “do
not know” if they support Slovenia’s membership in NATO has also grown over
time. These poll numbers should raise some concern from the allies.23 The approval numbers are still larger than those who oppose membership, but the polling does raise questions about the current political mood among the wider
Slovene population.
The growing opposition seems to be based on a variety of issues. Some
Slovenes opposed the National Assembly’s 2001 decision to allow its waters to
be used by nuclear-powered submarines and submarines with nuclear strike capabilities. The parliament approved the decision in part to allow NATO to conduct training operations in Slovenia’s Port of Koper.24 Other concerns stem from
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The argument advanced by some
Slovenes, especially the United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD), a party with
representation in the National Assembly, is that by allying with NATO, Slovenia
decreases its own security and becomes a more likely terrorist target.25 This opposition movement grew in 2002 and the ZLSD was also able to gather 8,000 signatures against NATO membership.26
Such expressions of disapproval are disquieting. When NATO’s 1999
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was in progress, one of NATO’s new allies, the
Czech Republic, provided only lukewarm support to the bombing campaign.
With the mission in progress, Czech parliamentary leaders expressed direct opposition to NATO’s objectives in Kosovo. Although Czech President Vaclav
Havel eventually became an outspoken supporter of Allied Force, many in the
republic’s parliament and nearly half its public continued to oppose NATO’s
68
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actions. Such opposition, especially from a new ally, was not welcomed by
then-NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and was an embarrassment for the
alliance.27 Thus, Slovenia’s growing minority factions who oppose NATO membership are troubling.
To deal with the growing domestic opposition, the Slovene government
took the important step of disseminating information to its citizens about the benefits of joining NATO by creating a toll-free telephone hotline to answer questions about membership.28 It also has developed a website in conjunction with
NATO in an effort to address specific concerns about NATO.29 These steps are
important for building support for the alliance, and to alleviate fears about membership. Based on the polling data noted earlier, some of the opposition appears
to stem from NATO’s 1997 rejection of Slovenia in Madrid. These remaining
hard feelings among some in the minority will likely dissipate with a membership invitation. Yet the government and especially the Defense Minister should
continue in their domestic lobbying efforts to convince as many Slovenes as possible of the benefits of alliance membership.
Finally, another political concern apart from NATO’s 1995 study, but a
factor that may hold some sway in the American Senate, is the remaining property claims from Americans who lost land or businesses in Slovenia under former
Yugoslav President Tito’s leadership. Upon his 2001 appointment as US Ambassador to Slovenia, Johnny Young noted explicitly that these claims would have to
be resolved before Slovenia is granted membership into NATO.30 These concerns
are being addressed and resolved, which is an important political step for
Slovenia as it moves toward full membership in the alliance, but full compliance
with American demands would be helpful in eliminating potential problems
among US Senators.
In sum, Slovenia generally meets all the political expectations set forth
by NATO’s enlargement study. Where political problems remain—i.e. its border
relations with Croatia and its growing opposition voices to NATO membership—its government is taking the necessary diplomatic and political steps to
address these issues. Moreover, the concerns noted above do not override Slovenia’s important progress in meeting the vast majority of NATO’s political expectations, or the government’s outspoken backing for NATO and its strategic
objectives in the post-Cold War era.

NATO’s Military Expectations
The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement also established a set of military
expectations for applicant states. These benchmarks include the applicant’s ability
to contribute to the alliance’s security. This vague expectation can be measured in
different ways, but generally implies that the applicant has a military that is able to
add to the alliance’s defense, and implies that the applicant has the financial capability to afford military improvements. The applicant also must have a record of
participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, which consists of military
Winter 2002-03
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“Through its membership, Slovenia would
provide a land connection between current
NATO allies Italy and Hungary, thus
eliminating two ‘islands’ within NATO.”

cooperation and training missions between the applicants and current NATO allies. Likewise, the applicant should have experience in peacekeeping operations.
The alliance also expects the applicants to meet a “minimal level of interoperability,” which is based on the idea that the alliance is multinational and requires the capability to work jointly in promoting NATO’s defense.31
Since gaining independence, Slovenia’s military has undergone considerable transformation, generally along the lines that NATO has suggested. Historically relying on conscription, Slovenia currently has a force size of 7,600
active troops, including approximately 3,500 professionals and 4,100 conscripts,
who serve seven-month terms.32 On 14 May 2002 the Slovenian parliament voted
to phase out the nation’s conscription policy, which would end in 2007. Moreover,
Defence Minister Grizold has expressed his support for a phased elimination of
conscription.33 By doing so, Slovenia takes an important step in simultaneously
downsizing and professionalizing its military force, which is an important policy
direction that all Vilnius nine states have been encouraged to implement.
In terms of new military equipment, Slovenia has taken modernization
steps to improve its rapid reaction and mobilization capabilities. One major program has been the upgrading of approximately 30 T-55 tanks, older armored systems that remained with Slovenia from the Yugoslav government. These tanks
now have improved firing and night-vision capabilities and faster mobility.
Slovenia also has purchased 28 new armored personnel carriers. The improved
T-55s and the new personnel carriers help Slovenia make the case that it does add
militarily to the alliance in the event of a future regional political crisis, which is
important considering the potentially volatile political conditions in nearby
Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. Moreover, these recent improvements
unquestionably add to Slovenia’s own defenses, which insulate the country from
the argument that it will be a security “free rider.”
In addition to these improvements, Slovenia has taken steps to improve
its aircraft and air defense capabilities in order to meet interoperability requirements with other NATO states. Slovenia has upgraded 12 Pilatus PC-9m jet aircraft, which now contain supersonic fighter aviation equipment and allow for
training with advanced aircraft technology.34 It also has recently purchased a
70

Parameters

short-ranged air-defense missile system from Germany, which also allows
Slovenes to learn and better coordinate with NATO missile defense systems.35
Like the other NATO aspirants, Slovenia suffers from serious forceprojection limitations. This problem was especially apparent for Slovenia during
the US-led war on the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet Slovenia has focused on areas
where it potentially can contribute to the alliance meaningfully. Its recent upgrades and purchases move Slovenia in the appropriate direction given its notable limitations.
Besides these quantifiable military measurements, Slovenian membership also brings strategic geographic benefits to the alliance, and thus contributes
in other important ways to the alliance’s defense. Through its membership,
Slovenia would provide a land connection between current NATO allies Italy and
Hungary, thus eliminating two “islands” within NATO. It is perhaps not surprising
that both states have campaigned actively for Slovenian membership.36 Slovenia’s
location in southern Europe offers the alliance another important military staging
point, if needed, for future operations in the Balkans. Recall that in 1995, the Italian government refused NATO’s request to allow the deployment of additional
F-117 aircraft to Italy during Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s two-week
bombing campaign on the Bosnian Serbs.37 Similarly, Hungary faced political
pressures during Operation Allied Force, NATO’s bombing campaign against
Slobodan Milosevic in 1999, as approximately 300,000 ethnic Hungarians were at
risk in northern Yugoslavia, which understandably limited Hungary’s ability to act
aggressively against Milosevic. Thus, besides the positive result of eliminating
two islands within NATO, by admitting Slovenia the alliance would benefit by
gaining another supportive and stable ally in the volatile Balkan region.
Slovenia’s record in NATO’s Partnership for Peace operations also is
noteworthy. Slovenia has not only served as a host site for these training programs, but has been an active participate in the program since its inception.38
Slovenia also cooperates in the Multinational Light Land Force with Italy and
Hungary in an effort to enhance military interoperability, and in a joint effort to
cooperate militarily in the harsh terrain in the region.39 It also provided small
troop contributions to the NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo,
as well as to the peacekeeping efforts in Albania, Cyprus, and the Middle East.40
Slovenia’s 10-day war for independence also merits some attention. Its
ability to defeat the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in 1991, in actions which
cost the lives of only 13 Slovenes and 39 JNA personnel, is best explained as an
interplay of political and military factors. Before Slovenia’s first democratic
elections in 1990, a small number of senior military officials put into place a secret command structure for its Territorial Defense forces. Senior military and political leaders in Slovenia expected that the Yugoslav Federal Republic would
assert control over the Territorial Defense forces as Slovenia moved toward independence. The JNA behaved as Slovenian officials anticipated, and the secret
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command structure proved crucial, surprising the JNA when Yugoslavia mobilized and attempted to control Slovenia in 1991.41
Slovenia also benefitted from excellent intelligence on the JNA’s military strategy. Slovenes who served in the JNA gave sensitive information to senior Slovene military and political leaders. The information allowed the
Territorial Defense forces to wage surprise guerrilla attacks against the JNA.
Slovenia also demonstrated excellent coordination between its military and
political-media staff. It successfully portrayed itself as the victim of a massive
attack by the JNA. The Territorial Defense forces purposely attacked helicopters and tanks in an effort to show the JNA as thrusting its superior weaponry
against the under-armed Slovenes. These attacks galvanized the world media and
centered attention on Slovenia’s resistance. At the same time, Slovenian political
leaders cultivated diplomatic ties with key European allies, notably Germany
and Austria, who spoke out against the JNA’s moves.42 Overall, the short war illustrated a well-planned military operation by the Territorial Defense forces,
coupled with a highly effective political and diplomatic strategy.
Slovenia’s military victory should not be exaggerated: Slobodan
Milosevic was not wholly committed to a military operation to prevent Slovenia’s
independence, and the JNA suffered from low motivation after the initial strikes
from the Slovenes.43 Moreover, by its own account, Slovenia could not have held
out much longer had the JNA decided to push forward aggressively.44 Yet in the end
the far superior military forces of the JNA retreated in defeat. This short war demonstrated that Slovenia is able to mobilize quickly, use sensitive intelligence effectively, and coordinate its political, military, and diplomatic tactics to generate
widespread support for its cause. The possibility of another military invasion of
Slovenia is remote, but Slovenia’s actions in 1991 do address those who emphasize
the importance of military self-defense among NATO applicants.
Slovenia’s defense spending levels have remained consistent, although
they still fall below NATO’s request of 2.0 percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) as an appropriate goal for all NATO applicants. Since 1998, Slovenia has
maintained a steady spending level of 1.4 to 1.5 percent of GDP on military expenditures, with a stated goal of coming closer to 2.0 percent by 2007-08.45 If one
measures spending per troop, however, Slovenia far surpasses other applicants—
which points to Slovenia’s small size, but also to the higher degree of military
professionalization possible in Slovenia vis-à-vis other applicant states.46
In sum, Slovenian membership in NATO would add to the alliance’s
military security. NATO’s military expectations for its applicants are met or are
very close to being met by Slovenia in 2002. Its spending levels could be higher,
but this is a problem common to other NATO applicants as well as current
member states.47 The strategic geographic benefits, Slovenia’s regional military
cooperation, and the recent military upgrades and movements toward force
restructuring make Slovenia an attractive NATO member-state. As indicated
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earlier, however, its force-projection limitations are notable, which has been
highlighted in the current war on terrorism.

Slovenia and the War on Terrorism
In the days following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, for the first time in its history NATO formally invoked
Article V of its Charter. Terrorism was a recognized threat in previous alliance
ministerial statements, but due to the gravity of the events and new threats present
after 9/11, terrorism’s saliency among security challenges was more prominent
than ever. As the enlargement process unfolded after the strikes, American relations with Russia improved considerably, which to some degree opened the door
for wider enlargement.48 The war against terrorism, however, may become a new
measuring stick, especially in the United States’ case, in determining how well
NATO’s applicants will assist the alliance. Questions of this nature will certainly
surface during the ratification process in the US Senate. Some analysts have suggested that military reforms to address terrorist threats should be a critical element
in determining who is invited into the alliance.49 At NATO’s June 2002 Defense
Ministerial Meetings, it was also noted explicitly in NATO’s Final Communique
that current allies must continue to adapt and reform their militaries in order to
meet future terrorist challenges.50 US Ambassador Young also made this point in a
speech before the Slovenian parliament.51 Thus, although fighting terrorism is not
a formal component of the 1995 study on enlargement, it may become a prominent
variable as NATO’s expansion unfolds.
After the terrorist attacks, Slovenia was quick to state that it would provide the United States unconditional support for the war on terrorism. It promised to share intelligence with the United States and to reform its banking laws in
order to better track terrorists’ monetary flows.52 It also offered cooperation with
the United States on its relatively lax travel regulations, which did not require a
visa in order to travel from Slovenia to the United States.53
Slovenia also noted, however, that it would not be able to provide troops
to support the war on terrorism in Afghanistan because of its poor transport capabilities.54 Slovenia did support the war by providing monetary and humanitarian
assistance to Afghan civilians. In a January 2002 address, Ambassador Young did
not express disappointment with the degree of assistance given.55 With little beyond its regional rapid reaction forces, it is not surprising that Slovenia was unable
to contribute troops to the conflict. Given its equipment limitations, Slovenia
should not be expected to have global reach capabilities. Slovenia’s decision not to
send ground forces to Afghanistan may also reflect a political decision by its government. If it had experienced any casualties in Afghanistan, public support for
membership in NATO could have been damaged considerably.
At the same time, Slovenia’s unwillingness to cooperate by providing
some military forces is of some concern. While Slovenia’s diplomatic statements
square firmly with what is expected of applicant states, and its cooperation in other
Winter 2002-03
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political fronts is commendable, Slovenia lost an important opportunity to assist
the alliance and the United States. Had the real desire existed, Slovenia could have
found ways to get troops to the region. Perhaps as a member, when the opposition
minority factions may no longer be a threat to Slovenia’s membership chances,
Slovenia will be a better ally, yet with this first test, the results raise some questions, especially considering the active support that came from other NATO applicants, namely Bulgaria and Romania.56 Because of its own domestic political
conditions and its aircraft limitations, its decision is understandable. Moreover,
given its otherwise extensive bilateral and diplomatic cooperation with the United
States and NATO on the war on terrorism, it has done what is necessary of an applicant state. A troop contribution to Afghanistan, however, would have done much
to alleviate any lingering doubts about its commitment to fight terrorism.

Conclusion
In its November 2002 Summit in Prague, NATO faces important questions about new members and the future of the alliance. Among the applicants,
Slovenia would be a useful addition to the alliance. Slovenia certainly passes
NATO’s test of a fully functional democracy with civilian control of its military.
Its government has expressed unwavering support for NATO’s broader strategic
mission in Europe and in membership itself. It has also taken the necessary steps
to reform its military, especially in the area of regional rapid reaction forces and
equipment. Other steps have been taken toward NATO’s interoperability requirements. Perhaps most important, Slovenia’s geographic location would help the
alliance by eliminating two “islands” in Europe, and could provide specific benefits as the need for Balkan stability remains ever-present. In some respects,
Slovenia can be compared to current NATO allies Iceland and Luxembourg. Iceland has no military of its own, and Luxembourg offers little to the alliance in
terms of military equipment and force-projection capabilities. But they both provide key strategic locations in the Atlantic Ocean and in the heart of Europe, and
they are valued members of the alliance.
Some areas of concern still exist: the recent growth in public opposition
within Slovenia to membership, and its limited force projection capabilities—
especially regarding the war on terrorism—give Slovenia’s critics legitimate issues to raise. Yet these problems can be overcome as the government works to
improve Slovenes’ understanding of NATO. Moreover, given Slovenia’s relative
small size, the allies’ expectations for substantial troop contributions and global
troop deployments have to be tempered with realistic assessments. Slovenia also
should take steps to resolve its nonthreatening but nonetheless troublesome border differences with Croatia. Slovenia also needs to continue to move toward the
2.0 percent defense spending level requested by NATO. In sum, however, these
concerns do not negate the important contributions Slovenia can make to the alliance. NATO will make a wise decision if it extends a membership invitation to
Slovenia at the Prague Summit.
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